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Abstract—Fake followers are those Twitter accounts created to inflate the number of followers of a target account. Fake followers are
dangerous to the social platform and beyond, since they may alter concepts like popularity and influence in the Twittersphere—hence
impacting on economy, politics, and Society. In this paper, we contribute along different dimensions. First, we review some of the most
relevant existing features and rules (proposed by Academia and Media) for anomalous Twitter accounts detection. Second, we create
a gold standard of verified human and fake accounts. Then, we exploit the gold standard to train a set of machine-learning classifiers
built over the reviewed rules and features. Most of the rules provided by Media provide unsatisfactory performance in revealing fake
followers, while features provided by Academia for spam detection result in good performance. Building on the most promising features,
we optimise the classifiers both in terms of reduction of overfitting and costs for gathering the data needed to compute the features.
The final result is a “Class A” classifier, that is general enough to thwart overfitting and that uses the less costly features, while being
able to correctly classify more than 95% of the accounts of the training set.
The findings reported in this paper, other than being supported by a thorough experimental methodology and being interesting on their
own, also pave the way for further investigation.
Index Terms—Twitter, fake followers detection, gold standard, machine learning
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1 INTRODUCTION
Originally started as a personal microblogging site,
Twitter has been transformed by common use to an
information publishing venue. As of December, 2013,
statistics reported 645 million of Twitter subscribers,
with some 300 billion (> 238) of tweets sent [16].
Twitter annual advertising revenue in 2013 has been
estimated to $405,500,000 [19]. Popular public characters,
such as actors and singers, as well as traditional mass
media (radio, TV, and newspapers) use Twitter as a new
media channel. Politicians commit a notable part of their
campaigning to their Twitter home pages, as it happened
for the last US presidential and Italian general election
events [23]. As a consequence, the Twitter platform
has raised the attention of Industry and Business as
well, with some (if not all) of the most famous brands
massively using this platform for business promotion [2].
Such a versatility and spread of use have made Twitter
the ideal arena for proliferation of anomalous accounts,
that behave in unconventional ways. Academia has fo-
cused its attention on spammers, that is those accounts
actively putting their efforts in spreading malware, send-
ing spam, and advertising activities of doubtful legal-
ity [4], [13], [22], [26]. Very often, to enhance the effective-
ness of spammers, they are armed with automated twit-
ting programs, known as bots. Such automated pieces of
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software could be designed and used to post legitimate
tweets as well—such as news updates.
In the recent past, media have started reporting
that the accounts of politicians, celebrities, and popular
brands featured a suspicious inflation of followers [5],
[6], [14]. So called fake followers correspond to Twitter
accounts specifically exploited to increase the number
of followers of a target account. As an example, during
the 2012 US election campaign, the Twitter account of
challenger Romney experienced a sudden jump in the
number of followers. The great majority of them has
been later claimed to be fake [14]. Similarly, before the
last general Italian elections took place (on the 25th
of February 2013), online blogs and newspapers had
reported statistical data over a supposed percentage of
fakes of major candidates [24].
At a first glance, acquiring fake followers could seem
a practice limited to foster one’s vanity—a maybe ques-
tionable, but harmless practice. However, a deeper anal-
ysis reveals that artificially inflating the number of fol-
lowers can also be finalized to make an account more
trustworthy and influential, in order to stand from the
crowd and to attract other genuine followers. Recently, it
seems that banks and financial institution are analyzing
Twitter and Facebook accounts of loan applicants before
granting the loan. In particular, they take in account the
number of friends and how their interactions influence
their decisions [12]. Indeed, the more the supposed influ-
ence, the more those accounts with lots of followers will
likely interfere with the genuine followers. Then, having
a dependable and popular profile could definitely help in
obtaining credit from a bank or even successfully engage
in social lending. Similarly, if the practice of buying fake
2followers is adopted by spammers, it can act as a way
to post more authoritative messages and launch more
effective advertising campaigns. The outcome could be
the alteration of the concepts of popularity and influence
in the Twittersphere, leading to formation of fictitious
public opinion and possible impact on real world econ-
omy and Society. That is why fake followers detection
is an issue worth addressing.
Fake followers detection seems to be an easy task for
many bloggers, that suggest their “golden rules” and
provide a series of criteria, to be used as red flags to
classify a twitter account behavior. However, such rules
are usually paired neither with analytic algorithms to
aggregate them, nor with validation mechanisms. As for
Academia, researchers have focused mainly on spam
and bot detection, with brilliant results characterizing
Twitter accounts based on their (non)-human features.
To the best of our knowledge, however, there is a lack
of analysis on fake followers characterization and detec-
tion. Moreover, most of the scientific studies generates a
classifier to discriminate twitter accounts. The classifier
is built as follows: researchers manually test the nature
of a set of accounts, that, upon testing, becomes the
training set for a machine learning-based classifier. The
intuitive drawback is that humans are not error-free,
and, thus, the manual classification phase is both error
prone and time consuming. In this paper, detection of
fake followers follows a classifier-based approach too.
However, we aim at overcoming the above drawbacks
of a manual construction of the training set, as clarified
in the following.
Contributions
The goal of this work is to shed light on the phenomenon
of fake followers, aiming at overcoming current limita-
tions in their classification and detection. In particular,
we provide the following contributions.
First, we provide a reference set of Twitter accounts,
a so-called gold standard, where humans and fakes are
known a priori.
Second, we test known methodologies for bot and
spam detection on our gold standard. In particular, we
apply to Twitter accounts in our reference set algorithms
based on 1) single classification rules proposed by blog-
gers, and 2) feature sets proposed in the literature. The
outcome of the analysis leads us to conclude that fake
followers detection deserves specialized mechanisms: in
particular, algorithms based on classification rules do not
succeed in detecting the fakes in our reference dataset.
Instead, classifiers based on features sets for spambot de-
tection work quite well also for fake followers detection.
Third, we classify all the investigated rules and fea-
tures based on the cost required for gathering the data
needed to compute them.
Then, we define an optimized classifier that makes
use of the the less costly features, while being able to
correctly classify more than 95% of the accounts, on the
training set.
Roadmap
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 considers related work in the area of Twitter
spam and bot detection. Section 3 describes our reference
dataset. In Section 4, we concentrate on a set of criteria
for fake followers detection promoted by social media
firms and we present the results of the application of
such criteria over the reference dataset. In Section 5, we
examine features used in past work for spam detection of
Twitter accounts and we assess the performance of a set
of machine-learning classifiers that we have trained over
the reference dataset with those features. In Section 6
we compute the cost for extracting the features our
classifiers are based upon. An optimized classifier is
provided yielding a good balance between fake detection
capability and crawling cost. Finally, Section 7 concludes
the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
In this section, we revise recent work in the area of spam
and automated detection of user behavior on Twitter.
The work in [22] presents an analysis on how spam-
mers operate on Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace. For
data gathering, the authors created a large set of honey
profiles on three social platforms, logged the kind of
contacts and messages that they received, and manually
analyzed the collected data. The analysis reported that
the suspicious accounts shared some common traits,
formalized by the authors in a set of features. They
served as input to a machine learning based classifier [8],
to take automatic decisions over a large set of unknown
accounts. Impressively, such an approach led to the
detection of more than 15,000 spam profiles, that Twitter
promptly deleted.
In [26], the authors observed that the more researchers
and engineers make progress in keeping Twitter a spam-
free online community, the more Twitter spammers are
evolving to evade existing detection techniques. They
also proposed a taxonomy of criteria for detecting Twit-
ter spammers. A series of experiments showed how the
newly designed criteria feature a detection rate higher
than existing ones.
Authors of [4] classify Twitter accounts in three classes:
humans, bot, and cyborgs. The latter class represents
either a bot-assisted humans or an human-assisted bots.
About six thousands accounts have been manually clas-
sified to create a training set and a test set, each one with
1,000 accounts for each of the three classes. The authors
build their classifier based on four components: an en-
tropy component that evaluates the timing regularity of
an account tweets; a spam filter to detect spam tweets;
an account property analyzer to extract additional infor-
mation; and a decision maker component. This last one
determines the class of a given account combining the
outputs of the other three parts with a multiclass linear
discriminant (LDA) analysis method.
3Work in [21] makes an interesting analysis on the
underground phenomenon of so called Twitter Account
Markets, i.e., websites offering their subscribers to pro-
vide followers in exchange for a fee, and to spread
promotional tweets on their behalf. The authors list a
series of criteria that are helpful to detect Account Mar-
kets clients that pay for acquiring followers and spam
with debatable tweets. In addition, criteria for detecting
the spammer victims are also highlighted. Results of
the analysis reveal a surprising and alarming business
behind this phenomenon.
A series of reports published by the firm digitalevalu-
ations.com [3] have attracted the attention of Italian and
European newspapers and magazines, raising doubts on
the Twitter popularity of politicians and leading inter-
national companies. A number of criteria, inspired by
common sense and denoting human behavior, are listed
in the reports and used to evaluate a sampling of the
followers of selected accounts. For each criterion satisfied
by a follower, a human score is assigned. For each not
fulfilled criterion, either a bot or neutral score is assigned
to the account. According to the total score achieved,
Twitter followers are classified either as humans, as bots
or as neutral (in this last case, there is no sufficient
information to assess their nature), providing a quality
score of the effective influence of the followed account.
The results in [3] lack a validation phase.
Beside academic work, we assisted to the proliferation
of online blogger and columnist posts, listing their own
criteria for Twitter bots detection. As an example, a well-
known blogger in [18] indicates as possible bots-like
distinctive signals the fact that bots accounts: 1) have
usually a huge amount of following and a small amount
of followers; 2) tweet the same thing to everybody; and,
3) play the follow/unfollow game, meaning that they
follow and then unfollow an account usually within 24
hours. Criteria advertised by online blogs are mainly
based on common sense and the authors usually do not
even suggest how to validate them.
Finally, some companies specialized in social media
analysis, like [17], [20], offer online services to analyze
how much a Twitter account is genuine in terms of its
followers. However, the criteria used for the analysis are
not publicly disclosed and just partially deducible from
information available on their web sites.
In the next sections of the paper, we introduce a
Twitter account dataset that we used to evaluate the
performance on detecting fake accounts of five of the
cited work, namely [3], [17], [18], [22], [26]. We are
aware that this selection is not exhaustive. However, it
considers a huge collection of criteria, that we further
leverage for our reasoning on fake follower detection. It
is worth noticing how other works for spam detection,
like [13], [27], base their results on subsets, or on slightly
modified versions, of the criteria considered by our
selected set of works.
We distinguish the above 5 works in two main cate-
gories, considering the type of algorithm used for the de-
tection: decision rule based or feature set based. The first
type of algorithms relies on a list of rules each account
has to be checked against: considering the output of each
check, the algorithm distinguish between the possible
classes. The second type of algorithms extracts from a
set of pre-classified accounts some properties that uses
to learn a model able to distinguish between the possible
classes. The first type of algorithms has been proposed
for fake/bot account detection, while the second type
has been used for spam account detection. We detail and
evaluate the first type of algorithms in Section 4 and the
second type in Section 5.
3 REFERENCE DATASETS
In this section, we present the datasets of Twitter ac-
counts (our “gold standard”) that we used to conduct
our empirical study and that will be used throughout
the paper. We detail how we collected each of them and
how we verified if they were genuine humans or fakes.
Despite the final size of the gold standard, to perform
our research, we altogether crawled 9 millions of Twitter
accounts and about 3 millions of tweets.
3.1 The Fake Project
The Fake Project started its activities on December 12,
2012, with the creation of the Twitter account @TheFake-
Project. Its profile reports the following motto: Follow
me only if you are NOT a fake and explains that the
initiative is linked with a research project owned by
researchers at IIT-CNR, in Pisa-Italy. The account biog-
raphy points to the project web page1. At that page, one
may find instructions to join the initiative and an overall
description of motivations and goals of the project. In a
first phase, the owners contacted further researchers and
journalists to advertise the initiative. The online version
of a popular Italian newspaper and a famous Italian
social media analyst promoted the project and invited
people to join it (see [11], [15] for an Italian version
of these pieces). Foreign journalists and bloggers also
supported the initiative in their countries. In a twelve
days period (Dec 12-24, 2012), the account has been
followed by 574 followers. Through Twitter API v1.1,
we crawled a series of public information from these
followers, i.e., their profiles and timeline information,
together with their followers and followings profiles. For
this dataset, we crawled these 574 accounts, leading to
the collection of 616,193 tweets and 971,649 relationships
(namely, linked Twitter accounts).
All those followers voluntarily joined the project. To
include them in our reference set of humans, we also
launched a verification phase. Each follower received a
direct message on Twitter from @TheFakeProject, con-
taining an URL to a CAPTCHA, unique for each fol-
lower. We consider as “certified human” all the 469




The #elezioni2013 dataset was born to support a re-
search initiative for a sociological study carried out in
collaboration with the University of Perugia and the
Sapienza University of Rome, on the strategic changes
in the Italian political panorama for the 3-year period
2013-2015. Researchers identified 84,033 unique Twitter
accounts that used the hashtag #elezioni2013 in their
tweets, during the period between January 9 and Febru-
ary 28, 2013. Identification of these accounts has been
based on specific keyword-driven queries on the user-
name and biography fields of the accounts’ profiles. Key-
words include blogger, journalist, social media strategist,
congressperson, representative. Specific names of polit-
ical parties have been also searched. In conclusion, all
the accounts belonging to politicians and candidates,
parties, journalists, bloggers, specific associations and
groups, and whoever somehow was officially involved
in politics, have been discarded. Accounts not having
a biography have been discarded too. The remaining
accounts (about 40k) have been classified as citizens.
This last set has been sampled (with confidence level
95% and confidence interval 2.5), leading to a final set
of 1488 accounts, that have been subject to a manual
verification to determine the nature of their profiles and
tweets. Finally, 1481 accounts became part of dataset
#elezioni2013.
3.3 Gold standard of human accounts
The above introduced datasets form our final set of
about 1950 verified human accounts. It is worth noticing
how the two subsets differ from each other. The Fake
Project consists of accounts that have been recruited on
a volunteer base: people involved in the initiative aimed
to be part of an academic study for discovering fake
followers on Twitter, and are a mixture of researchers
and social media experts and journalists, mostly from
Italy, but also from US and other European countries.
The #elezioni2013 set consists of particularly active Ital-
ian Twitter users, with different professional background
and belonging to diverse social classes, sharing a com-
mon interest for politics, but that do not belong to
the following categories: politicians, parties, journalists,
bloggers.
3.4 Gold standard of fake followers
In April, 2013, we bought 3000 fake accounts from three
different Twitter online markets. In particular, we bought
1000 fakes accounts from http://fastfollowerz.com, 1000
from http://intertwitter.com, and 1000 fake accounts
from http://twittertechnology.com, at a price of $19, $14
and $13 respectively.
4 ALGORITHMS BASED ON CLASSIFICATION
RULES
In this section, we detail three procedures explicitly
conceived for fake and bot account detection, namely [3],
[17], [18]. Coincidentally, all of them are proposed as
algorithms relying on a list of rules, or criteria: each
account to be classified is checked against all the rules
and the output of the checks are combined together
in order to make the final classification. For each of
the procedures, we report the criteria as indicated by
the original sources, and we further specify how we
implemented them into a rule suitable to be applied
over our datasets. We also detail the reason for our
implementation choices.
In this section, we mainly focus on the application of
each single rule over our dataset, to assess its strength to
discriminate fake followers. Indeed, in many cases, the
analyzed algorithm did not specify the final combination
of the proposed rule outcomes. Details on how aggrega-
tion has been performed are provided in [3] only. Driven
by the provided details, we implement the full algorithm
and we present its detection performances in Section 4.5.
Throughout the sequel of the paper we use the term
“friends” to denote the users followed by an account
(i.e., if A follows B, B is a friend of A).
4.1 Followers of political candidates
Camisani-Calzolari [3] carried out a series of tests over
samples of Twitter followers of Romney and Obama, for
the last US presidential election candidates, as well as
for popular Italian politicians. In [3] it is detailed an
algorithm to evaluate the account nature based on some
of its public features. The cited algorithm has enough
details to be reproducible: it assigns human/active and
bot/inactive scores and classifies an account considering
the gap between the sum of two scores. In particular, the
algorithm assigns to the examined accounts 1 (or more,
where specified) human point for each of the following
criteria:
1) the profile contains a name;
2) the profile contains an image;
3) the profile contains a physical address;
4) the profile contains a biography;
5) the account has at least 30 followers;
6) it has been inserted in a list by other Twitter users;
7) it has written at least 50 tweets;
8) the account has been geo-localized;
9) the profile contains a URL;
10) it has been included in another user’s favorites;
11) it writes tweets that have punctuation;
12) it has used a hashtag in at least one tweet;
13) it has logged into Twitter using an iPhone;
14) it has logged into Twitter using an Android device;
15) it is connected with Foursquare;
16) it is connected with Instagram;
17) it has logged into twitter.com website;
18) it has written the userID of another user in at least
one tweet, that is it posted a @reply or a mention;
19) (2*number followers) ≥ (number of friends);
20) it publishes content which does not just contain
URLs;
521) at least one of its tweets has been retwitted by other
accounts (it’s worth 2 points);
22) it has logged into Twitter through different clients
(it’s worth 3 points).
Moreover, the account receives 2 bot points if it only uses
APIs. Finally, for each criterion that fails to be verified,
the account receives 1 bot point, with the exception of
criteria 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 8: in this cases, no bot points
are assigned. To verify those rules, we referred to the
source metadata of the tweets, that contains a different
value representing from which platform the user posted
a tweet. In particular, concerning the above rules, we
considered the source metadata with the values iphone,
android, foursquare, instagram and web, respectively, and
we assigned 1 human point for each of the values found
at least once within the collected tweets of the account.
For the criterion 21, 2 bot points are assigned if no tweets
of the account have been retweeted by other users.
Considering rule 22, geo-localization is related to tweets.
Consequently, we set this rule as satisfied when at least
one tweet of the account has been geo-localized.
For the rule 11, punctuation has been searched in both
the profile biography and in its timeline.
4.2 Stateofsearch.com
Among the several bloggers that propose their golden
rules to identify suspicious Twitter accounts, we consider
the “7 signals to look out for recognizing Twitter bots”,
according to the founder of the social media website
stateofsearch.com [18]. The “7 signals to look out for” to
recognize Twitter bots are the following [18]:
1) the biography of the profile clearly specifies that it
is a bot account;
2) the friends/followers ratio is in the order of 100:1;
3) the account tweets the same sentence to many other
accounts;
4) different accounts with duplicate profile pictures
are suspicious;
5) accounts that tweet from API are suspicious;
6) the response time (follow+reply) to tweets of other
accounts is within milliseconds;
7) the account tends to follow/unfollow other ac-
counts within a temporal arc of 24 hours.
The rule 3 has been implemented considering the
tweet as a single unit . We consider the last 20 tweets
of each timeline.
For the rule 4, we consider the existence of a dupli-
cate profile picture when at least 3 accounts within the
dataset have the same profile picture.
For the rule 5, we consider as tweets posted from
API all those tweets not being posted from the website
twitter.com.
We did not apply rules 6 and 7 to our datasets, since
they require to actively interact with the account. This
means that those rules cannot be used to support an
automatic detection process.
4.3 Socialbakers Fake Follower Check
Several companies provide online tools to classify Twit-
ter followers based on their fakeness degree. Here, we
consider the FakeFollowerCheck tool, by Socialbak-
ers [17]. While the company website provides eight
criteria to evaluate the fakeness degree of the followers
of a certain account, it omits details on how to combine
such criteria to classify the account. We contacted their
customer service, but we were answered that “how the
respective criteria are measured is rather an internal
information”. The FakeFollowerCheck tool considers the
followers of an account and consider them likely fake
when the following criteria are satisfied:
1) the ratio friendsfollowers of the account under investigation
is 50:1, or more;
2) more than 30% of all the tweets of the account use
spam phrases, such as “diet”, “make money” and
“work from home”;
3) the same tweets are repeated more than three times,
even when posted to different accounts;
4) more than 90% of the account tweets are retweets;
5) more than 90% of the account tweets are links;
6) the account has never tweeted;
7) the account is more than two months old and still
has a default profile image;
8) the user did not fill in neither bio nor location and,
at the same time, she is following more than 100
accounts.
For the rule 2, we consider as spam phrases expressions
like “diet” or “make money” or “work from home” (both
English and Italian translations), as suggested by the
website of Socialbakers.
It is worth noticing that the website reports the Fake
Follower Check as a beta version, adding the following:
“We are currently tweaking the algorithm”. Therefore,
we consider the criteria published on the firm website
in December 2013.
4.4 Evaluation methodology
All the criteria above detailed have been applied to
our mixed dataset, composed of a priori known human
accounts, belonging to The Fake Project (469 verified
accounts) and to #elezioni2013 (1481 verified accounts),
as well as the fake accounts bought from the Twitter
account markets, as described in Section 3. To obtain a
mixed and balanced dataset of accounts composed by
50% of humans and 50% of fakes, we randomly chose
1950 out of the 3000 fake accounts bought. This set of
3900 accounts (a subset of our gold standard) has been
used as the reference dataset for all our experiments
(where not otherwise specified).
We conducted one experiment for each rule, consider-
ing two classes of accounts, the fakes and the humans.
To summarize the outcomes of each experiment, we
introduce four standard indicators, namely:
• True Positive (TP): the number of those fake followers
recognized by the rule as fakes;
6outcome
dataset real humans humans bots neutral
@TheFakeProject 469 456 3 10
#elezioni2013 1481 1480 0 1
100% fake 0 2889 185 277
TABLE 1
Camisani-Calzolari algorithm outcomes on gold standard
• True Negative (TN): the number of those human
followers recognized by the rule as humans;
• False Positive (FP): the number of those human fol-
lowers recognized by the rule as fakes;
• False Negative (FN): the number of those fake follow-
ers recognized by the rule as humans.
The meaning of each indicator is graphically high-
lighted by the following matrix (called the confusion
matrix [10]), where each column represents the instances
in the predicted class, while each row represents the
instances in the actual class:
predicted class
actual class human fake
human TN FP
fake FN TP
In order to evaluate the application of each single rule
to the accounts in the gold standard, we consider the
following, standard, evaluation metrics:
• Precision: the proportion of predicted positive cases
that are indeed real positive, that is TPTP+FP ;
• Recall: the proportion of real positive cases that are
indeed predicted positive, that is TPTP+FN ;
• F-Measure: the harmonic mean of precision and re-
call, namely 2·precision·recallprecision+recall
• Matthew Correlation Coefficient (MCC from now
on) [1]: the estimator of the correlation between the
predicted class and the real class of the samples.
This metric is considered the unbiased version of
the F-Measure, since it uses all four elements of the
confusion matrix:
TP · TN - FP · FN√
(TP+FN)(TP+FP)(TN+FP)(TN+FN)
A MCC value close to 1 means that the prediction
is really accurate, a value close to 0 means that the
prediction is no better than random and a value close to
-1 means that the prediction is heavily in disagreement
with the real class. Then, we consider as best rules those
criteria whose application gives MCC ≥ 0.6, since such
rules have the strongest correlation with the typology of
the accounts.
4.5 Evaluation of Camisani-Calzolari algorithm
The detection algorithm in [3] aggregates the twenty-two
criteria for identifying human and bot behavior, above
introduced in Section 4.1. The algorithm evaluates every
single rule on the account under investigation, and it
assigns a positive human score or a negative bot score,
according to the output of the rule application. The final
outcome depends on the global score obtained by the
account: if the result is a score greater than 0, then the
account is marked as human; if it is between 0 and -4, it
is marked as neutral; otherwise, it is marked as bot.
Table 1 reports in detail the results of running the
algorithm over the complete reference dataset, including
all the bought fake accounts. Although obtaining very
good results in detecting the real human accounts, the
algorithm achieves a poor fake account detection. Most
of the accounts have been erroneously tagged as humans
too. The main motivation of this unsatisfactory result is
that the fake followers in our dataset feature character-
istics that easily make them obtaining a human score
higher than the bot one.
4.6 Single rule evaluation
Table 2 summarizes the results obtained by the appli-
cation to our dataset of each single rule in sections 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3. In the table, we have highlighted the rules
whose application on our dataset results in higher MCC
values. Visibly, only three rules obtained a value higher
than 0.6, namely:
1) the threshold of at least 30 followers;
2) the threshold of at least 50 tweets;
3) the use of a userID in at least one tweet.
Noticeably, none of the criteria suggested by online
blogs and those addressed by Socialbakers FakeFollow-
erCheck are successful in detecting the fakes in our
dataset. Clearly, the rules proposed by State of Search
are aimed at detecting bots and, actually, we did not
expect they would have performed brilliantly on detect-
ing fakes. However, we observe that the rule “tweet
from API” has an MCC of -0.779, meaning that it is
strictly related to the class of the account, but by an
inverse factor: in our dataset, fake accounts almost never
tweet from API (instead, they use Twitter.com to tweet),
whereas human accounts have posted at least once from
outside the website. This is exactly the opposite behavior
than that suggested by the blogger for bots, that almost
exclusively post tweets using API.
Another interesting observation is that many rules
proposed by Socialbakers have MCC values close to 0,
meaning that their outcomes are almost unrelated with
the class of the accounts. Indeed, the large majority of the
accounts are recognized as humans (remember that TN
is the number of human accounts recognized as humans
and FN is the number of fakes recognized as humans).
In other words, independently from the typology of the
account, the rules are almost always satisfied, making
it severely flawed for fake detection purposes. Such an
independence from the account type is also exhibited by
many other rules of both [3] and [18], like, for example,
“bot in biography”, “profile has a name”, or “profile has
an image”, as shown in Table 2.
7results evaluation metrics
rule description TP TN FP FN precision recall F-M. MCC
Camisani-Calzolari [3] (satisfaction of rules means human behavior)
1 profile has name 0 1950 0 1950 — — — —
2 profile has image 2 1931 19 1948 0.095 0.001 0.002 -0.06
3 profile has address 323 1313 637 1627 0.336 0.166 0.222 -0.187
4 profile has biography 617 1806 144 1333 0.811 0.316 0.455 0.306
5 followers ≥ 30 1852 1582 368 98 0.834 0.95 0.888 0.768
6 belongs to a list 1893 1052 898 57 0.678 0.971 0.799 0.566
7 tweets ≥ 50 1582 1792 158 368 0.909 0.811 0.857 0.735
8 geo-localization 1923 678 1272 27 0.602 0.986 0.748 0.434
9 has URL in profile 1895 697 1253 55 0.602 0.972 0.743 0.417
10 in favorites 1130 1748 202 820 0.848 0.579 0.689 0.502
11 uses punctuation in tweets 93 1948 2 1857 0.979 0.048 0.091 0.151
12 uses hashtags 437 1934 16 1513 0.965 0.224 0.364 0.337
13 uses iPhone to log in 1905 845 1105 45 0.633 0.977 0.768 0.489
14 uses Android to log in 1932 677 1273 18 0.603 0.991 0.75 0.442
15 has connected with Foursquare 1943 261 1689 7 0.535 0.996 0.696 0.257
16 has connected with Instagram 1890 772 1178 60 0.616 0.969 0.753 0.446
17 uses the website Twitter.com 131 1852 98 1819 0.572 0.067 0.12 0.036
18 has tweeted a userID 1071 1941 9 879 0.992 0.549 0.707 0.609
19 2*followers ≥ friends 1947 863 1087 3 0.642 0.998 0.781 0.531
20 tweets do not just contain URLs 125 1943 7 1825 0.947 0.064 0.12 0.167
21 retwitted tweets ≥ 1 1021 1915 35 929 0.967 0.524 0.679 0.569
22 uses different clients to log in 118 1924 26 1832 0.819 0.061 0.113 0.125
Van Den Beld (State of search) [18] (satisfaction of rules means bot behavior)
1 bot in biography 0 1950 0 1950 — — — —
2 following:followers = 100:1 158 1950 0 1792 0.541 1 0.15 0.205
3 same sentence to many accounts 188 1521 429 1762 0.438 0.78 0.146 -0.169
4 duplicate profile pictures 26 1809 141 1924 0.471 0.928 0.025 -0.146
5 tweet from API 429 33 1917 1521 0.118 0.017 0.2 -0.779
Socialbakers [17] (satisfaction of rules means fake behavior)
1 friends:followers ≥ 50:1 316 1949 1 1634 0.997 0.162 0.279 0.296
2 tweets spam phrases 5 1950 0 1945 1 0.003 0.005 0.036
3 same tweet ≥ 3 30 1327 623 1920 0.046 0.015 0.023 -0.407
4 retweets ≥ 90% 14 1933 17 1936 0.452 0.007 0.014 -0.009
5 tweet-links≥ 90% 58 1936 14 1892 0.806 0.03 0.057 0.084
6 0 tweets 84 1949 1 1866 0.988 0.043 0.083 0.146
7 default image after 2 months 2 1931 19 1948 0.095 0.001 0.002 -0.06
8 no bio, no location, friends ≥100 255 1927 23 1695 0.917 0.131 0.229 0.231
TABLE 2
Rules evaluation
We acknowledge that our fake followers dataset could
be illustrative, and not exhaustive, of all the possible
existing sets of fakes. However, it is worth noticing
that we found the Twitter accounts marketplaces by
simply Web searching them on the most common search
engines. Thus, we can argue that our dataset represents
what is easily possible to find on the Web.
5 EVALUATION OF ALGORITHMS BASED ON
FEATURE SETS
In this section, we examine work in [22], [26] that address
spam account detection on Twitter. Both of them propose
a list of features to be extracted from manually classified
datasets of accounts. Such features sets are then used
to train and test machine learning classifiers that learn
to distinguish among humans and spammers. Even if
the proposed features have been originally designed for
spam detection, here, for the first time, we consider them
to spot another category of Twitter accounts, i.e., the fake
followers.
5.1 Detecting spammers in social networks
The work presented in [22] focuses on detecting spam-
bots exploiting five features, that can be gathered crawl-
ing an account’s details, both from its profile and time-
line. The features are:
1) the number of friends;
2) the number of tweets;
3) the content of tweets;
4) the URL ratio in tweets;
5) the relation between the number of friends and
followers.
For each investigated account, such features are given as
input to a Random Forest algorithm [7], [8], that outputs
if the account is a spambot or not. In particular, results of
the analysis in [22] show that, on average, the accounts
under investigation show a spambot behavior if:
1) they do not have thousands of friends;
2) they have sent less than 20 tweets;
3) the content of their tweets exhibits the so called
message similarity;
84) they a high tweets containing URLstotal tweets ratio (URL ratio);
5) they have a high friends(followersˆ2) ratio value (i.e., lower
ratio values mean legitimate users).
We briefly give some notes on how we use the features
of [22] over our dataset. For feature 3, we implement the
notion of message similarity by checking the existence of
at least two tweets, in the last 15 tweets of the account
timeline, in which 4 consecutive words are equal (words
are consecutive characters separated by white spaces).
This notion has been given in a latter work by the same
authors, see [21].
Without the original training set, we were unable to
reproduce the same classifier, but we picked the five
features and used them to train a set of classifiers
with our dataset. The results are reported in Table 3 of
Section 5.3.
5.2 Fighting evolving Twitter spammers
The authors of [25], [26] observed that Twitter spammers
often modify their behavior in order to evade existing
spam detection techniques. Thus, they suggested to con-
sider some new features, making evasion more difficult
for spammers. Beyond the features directly available
from the account profile lookup, the authors propose
some graph-, automation-, and timing-based features.
We detail nine of them:
1) age of the account (this feature also appears in [13]);
2) bidirectional link ratio, i.e., bidirectional linksfriends , where a
bidirectional link is when two accounts follow each
other;
3) average neighbors’ followers, i.e., the average number
of followers of the account’s friends. This feature
aims at reflecting the quality of the choice of friends
of an account;
4) average neighbors’ tweets: the average number of
tweets of the account’s followers;
5) followings to median neighbor’s followers of an ac-
count, defined as the ratio between the number
of friends and the median of the followers of its
friends;
6) API ratio (= number of tweets sent from API / total
number of tweets);
7) API URL ratio (= number of tweets posted from
API and containing URL / total number of tweets
posted from API);
8) API tweet similarity: this metric considers only the
number of similar tweets sent from API. The notion
of tweet similarity is as in Section 5.1;
9) following rate: this metric reflects the speed at which
an accounts follows other accounts.
The authors of [25], [26] combine their features in four
different machine learning classifiers and compare their
implementation with other existing approaches. Their
results on the nine features were as follows:
1) age: the more an account is aged, the more it could
be considered a good one;
2) bidirectional link ratio has been tested to be lower for
spammer accounts than for legitimate accounts;
3) average neighbors’ followers is commonly higher for
legitimate accounts than for spammers;
4) average neighbors’ tweets should be lower for spam-
mers than for legitimate accounts;
5) followings to median neighbor’s followers has been
found higher for spammers than for legitimate
accounts;
6) API ratio: work in [4], [26] reveal higher values for
suspicious accounts;
7) API URL ratio is higher for suspicious accounts;
8) API tweet similarity: the idea is that a higher API
tweet similarity of an account implies that this
account is suspicious;
9) following rate: the idea is that higher values are
related to spammers.
We were unable to completely reproduce the machine
learning classifiers in [26], since we had a different
dataset, but here we evaluate how those features, proved
to be quite robust against evasion techniques adopted by
spammers, perform in detecting fake followers.
Some notes follow on our implementation of the fea-
tures above. Precisely evaluating rule 9 requires to know
the evolution of the number of friends of an account.
Actually, this kind of information is publicly unavailable
and, as in [26], we approximate the rate as the ratio
friends/age.
Interestingly, the authors of [26] also suggest two
further graph-based features. The first feature is the local
clustering coefficient and it quantifies how close the neigh-
bors of a Twitter account are to be a clique. The intuitive
idea behind this feature is that spammers blindly follow
other accounts, that do not know each other and have a
looser relationship among them, thus, they do not form a
clique. Therefore, spammers have lower local clustering
coefficients, compared to humans. The second feature
is the betweenness centrality which reflects the position
of a node in the graph (namely how much a node is
involved in the shortest paths between all the possible
pairs of vertices). The intuitive idea behind this feature
is that, following unrelated accounts, the spammer will
create new shortest paths between those who re-follow
it, leading to a position in the graph more central for the
spammer than for human accounts.
Although these features should be very effective to
recognize spammers, unfortunately they are extremely
computational expensive to evaluate and the same au-
thors evaluated it using a simplified approach. This
is the reason why we have not implemented them in
our analysis, and, thus, how these features behave in
discriminating fake followers is an open issue.
Finally, note that in [26] there are also other features,
in addition to the above-mentioned; however, as claimed
by the same authors, they are less robust against evasion
techniques. For this reason, we decided not to include
them in our evaluation.
9results evaluation metrics
classifier TP TN FP FN precision recall F-M. MCC
Classifiers based on feature set of Yang et al. [26]
RF Random Forest 1933 17 17 1933 0.991 0.991 0.991 0.983
D Decorate 1927 23 14 1936 0.988 0.993 0.991 0.983
J48 Decision Tree 1933 17 21 1929 0.991 0.989 0.990 0.980
AB Adaptive Boosting 1928 22 26 1924 0.989 0.987 0.988 0.974
BN Bayesian Network 1939 11 81 1869 0.994 0.958 0.976 0.936
Classifiers based on feature set of Stringhini et al. [22]
RF Random Forest 1917 33 40 1910 0.983 0.979 0.981 0.961
D Decorate 1919 31 41 1909 0.984 0.979 0.981 0.961
J48 Decision Tree 1919 31 51 1899 0.984 0.974 0.979 0.953
AB Adaptive Boosting 1882 68 58 1892 0.965 0.970 0.968 0.938
BN Bayesian Network 1859 91 91 1859 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.907
Classifier based on Camisani-Calzolari algorithm [3]
CC Camisani-Calzolari] 1936 3 1687 111 0.534 0.998 0.696 0.178
TABLE 3
Performance comparison for 10-fold cross validation. Training set: 1950 humans and 1950 fake. (]): the CC algorithm
classified 163 accounts as neutral.
5.3 Evaluation
To evaluate the feature sets described in Sections 5.1
and 5.2, we used five classifiers obtained exploiting
five different machine learning based algorithms, namely
Decorate (D), Adaptive Boost (AB), Random Forest (RF),
Decision Tree (J48) and Bayesian Network (BN), all
implemented within the Weka framework [7]. Random
Forest was the only used by the authors of [22] and
all of them, but Adaptive Boost, were used by the
authors of [26] to build spam detection classifiers. We
also included AB since it is considered one of the more
effective machine learning algorithm for classification
tasks. For both the considered works, we built five clas-
sifiers adopting the suggested features, and training the
models using our reference dataset. Then, we used a 10-
fold cross validation [8] to estimate the performances of
each obtained classifier. As for the rule-based algorithms
in Section 4.4, we consider the MCC as the preferred
metric to assess classifier performances. The obtained
results are summarized in Table 3. The table also reports
the results of the classification algorithm proposed in [3]
and discussed in Section 4.5.
We observe that all the classifiers built with the feature
set of [26] obtain better results, compared to the others.
In particular, RF, J48 and D classifiers have a MCC
above 0.98. Similarly, precision and recall are around
0.99 for all of them. The classifiers built with the feature
set of Stringhini et al. [22], also, obtain extremely high
detection levels: precision and recall are around 0.98
for RF and D, with an MCC of 0.96. Overall, even if
some small differences can be observed in the number
of false negatives and false positives, all the classifiers
almost correctly distinguish between human and fake
follower accounts, in our reference dataset. The feature-
based classifiers are indisputably more accurate for fake
detection when compared with the CC algorithm, that
does not perform well within our dataset, as observed
above in Section 4.5.
5.4 Discussion
By examining the internal structure of the classifiers, we
get insights about the best features that contribute more
to distinguish humans and fakes. In case of decision
trees, the best features are the ones closer to the root
and the classifier automatically finds the numeric thresh-
olds characterizing, for a given feature, the borderline
between humans and fakes. It is worth noticing also that
the Decorate, AdaBoost, and Random Forest algorithms
exploit, ultimately, combinations of simple decision tree
classifiers. Despite their very good performance, they
have the disadvantage of being difficult to analyze, since
they can consist in tens of individual trees that interact
together. Then, we only focus on the J48 classifier (a
single decision tree) to examine how the features are
applied during the classification process.
5.4.1 Differences between fake followers and spam ac-
counts
Looking at the tree structure, we observe some interest-
ing differences between the fake followers in our dataset
and the spam accounts characterized in [22] and [26].
For example, the feature URL ratio has been found to
have a higher value for spammers than for legitimate
users, as highlighted in [22] (Section 5.1). Observing the
tree structure of our J48 classifier, instead, low values
for this feature characterize fake followers, compared
with higher values that indicate human accounts in our
gold standard. More than 72% of the fake followers in
our training dataset have a URL ratio lower than 0.05,
oppositely to 14% of human accounts. Similarly, the API
ratio feature has been found higher for spammers than
for legitimate accounts ( [26], see also Section 5.2). In our
dataset, the API ratio is lower than 0.0001 for 78% of fake
followers. A similar behavior has been observed for the
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tree details evaluation metrics
pruning method nodes leaves height TP rate FP rate precision recall F-M. MCC
Decision tree based on feature set of Stringhini et al. [22]
subtree raising 0.25 43 22 7 0.979 0.021 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.953
reduced error 3 folds 31 16 5 0.975 0.025 0.975 0.975 0.975 0.943
reduced error 50 folds 9 5 4 0.964 0.036 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.914
Decision tree based on feature set of Yang et al. [26]
subtree raising 0.25 33 17 8 0.99 0.01 0.991 0.989 0.99 0.980
reduced error 3 folds 19 10 5 0.988 0.012 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.976
reduced error 50 folds 11 6 3 0.982 0.018 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.966
Decision tree based on feature set of Yang et al. [26], without the bi-link ratio feature
subtree raising 0.25 101 51 10 0.96 0.04 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.917
reduced error 3 folds 53 27 8 0.961 0.039 0.961 0.961 0.961 0.914
reduced error 50 folds 37 19 9 0.933 0.067 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.866
TABLE 4
Performance comparison with increased pruning. 10-fold cross validation. Training set: 1950 humans and 1950 fakes.
average neighbor’s tweets feature, that has been found to
be lower for spammers in [26], but higher for our fakes.
These initial observations highlight a behavioral dif-
ference between a spam account and a fake follower.
In particular, fake followers appear to be more passive
compared to spammers and they do not make use of
automatized mechanisms for posting their tweets, as
spammers usually do.
5.4.2 Reducing overfitting
It is well known that trained classifiers can be subject to
“overfitting”, namely the problem of being too special-
ized on the training dataset and unable to generalize the
classification to new and unseen data [9]. In other words,
the classifier could have worse predictive ability since its
internal structure and reasoning are more complicated
than required.
A simple way to avoid overfitting is to keep the
classifier as simple as possible. In case of a decision tree
algorithm, for example, one solution could be reducing
the number of nodes and, possibly, the height of the tree.
The decision tree obtained with the feature set of [22] has
22 leaves, 43 nodes, and a height of 7, whereas the best
feature is the friends/(followersˆ2) ratio that places at the
root. The decision tree with the feature set of [26] has 17
leaves, 33 nodes and a height of 8, with the bi-directional
link ratio as the root.
A common practice to generalize the classifiers is the
adoption of a more aggressive pruning strategy, e.g., by
using the reduce-error pruning with small test sets [7],
[8]. Adopting this strategy, we were able to obtain sim-
pler trees with a lower number of nodes and a very
reduced height. Such simpler trees only use subsets of
the feature set, still maintaining very good performance
on our dataset.
Table 4 reports the characteristics and the performance
of the experiments we have carried out, varying the
pruning strategy. It is worth noticing that the complexity
of the tree is not directly responsible of the improvement
in the detection capability: for example, for the feature
set of [26], reducing the number of nodes from 33 to 11
decreases the TP rate of 0.018 and the MCC of 0.014, only.
The results of this experiment show that, even reducing
the features, it is possible to have a detection rate higher
than 0.95 (as in the last line of Table 4, for [22] and [26],
respectively. For example, in those two experiments, the
features used by the pruned tree were only bi-directional
link ratio, the average neighbors’ followers, the age, and the
followings to median neighbors’ followers as a subset of the
original feature set of [26], and the friends/(followersˆ2),
URL ratio, and number of friends as the subset for [22]’s
original feature set.
5.4.3 Bidirectional link ratio
To test if the bidirectional link ratio is the decisive feature
to distinguish between humans and fake followers in
our reference dataset and how much it influences the
detection process, we compare the results of the previous
experiments with a new one: we build a decision tree
classifier leaving out the bi-link ratio from the feature
set of [26].
This experiment is particularly interesting since, as de-
tailed in next Section 6, this feature is the more expensive
to evaluate, especially in terms of crawling. The results
in Table 4 show a limited lowering of both TP rate and
FP rate for the less pruned trees (subtree raising 0.25
and reduced error 3 folds), but a more evident reduction
of the MCC measure. The reduced error pruning with
50 folds produces a classifier that has MCC dropping
from 0.966 to 0.866. However, the detection level (TP
rate) is still very good for all the three pruned trees
(0.96, 0.961 and 0.933, respectively). The more interesting
aspect is the increased complexity of the decision tree:
without the bi-link ratio, the classifiers need to resort to
a considerably larger number of nodes. For example, the
tree that does not use that feature, pruned with subtree
raising confidence of 0.25, requires 101 nodes, whereas
the tree that uses it requires only 33.
From the results shown in Table 4, we conclude that
the bidirectional link ratio is an important feature for
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fake follower detection: even if not essential, it is ex-
tremely effective to the detection process.
6 OPTIMIZED CLASSIFIER
As previously shown in Sections 4 and 5, the classifiers
based on feature sets perform much better than those
based on rules. Similarly, we have seen that the feature
set proposed by Yang et al. seems to be slightly more
effective than that proposed by Stringhini, when used in
feature-based classifiers aiming at fake followers detec-
tion. Here, we look for an optimized classifier, exploiting
the best features and the best rules, not only in terms of
detection performance, but also considering their eval-
uation costs. In particular, we can distinguish between
the computational cost and the crawling cost required to
evaluate a feature (or a rule). Computational costs can be
generally lowered with optimized algorithms and data
representations and they are negligible when compared
to the crawling costs. Thus, in this section we focus on
the latter: we quantify the crawling cost of each feature
and rule, and we build a set of optimized classifiers
that make use of the more efficient features and rules,
in terms of crawling cost and fake followers detection
capability. For the sake of readability, in the following
section with the term “feature” we intend all the rules
and features presented in Sections 4 and 5.
6.1 Crawling cost analysis
Intuitively, some features require few data for their
calculation, while others require the download of big
amounts of data. For the sake of this analysis, we divide
the features in three categories:
A) profile: features that require information present in
the profile of the followers of the target account
(like, e.g., profile has name);
B) timeline: features that require the tweets posted in
the timeline of the followers of the target account
(like, e.g., tweet from API);
C) relationship: features that require information of the
accounts that are in a relationship (i.e., that are a
friend, or a follower, or both) with the followers of
the target account (like, e.g., bidirectional link ratio).
Each category, in turn, belongs to a crawling cost class
directly related to the amount of data to be crawled
from Twitter. Starting from the list of the followers of a
target account, Class A features can be evaluated simply
accessing to all the profiles of the followers; Class B
features require to download all the tweets posted by
each follower; Class C features need to crawl the friends
and the followers of each follower of the target account.
To evaluate the class of cost associated to each feature’s
category, we estimate the number of API calls needed to
download data required for the calculation. Results are
in Tables 5 and 6. The following parameters refer to the


































16 ∗ f unpredictable
Calls/min. 12 12 1
TABLE 5
Number of API calls needed to download data
f : number of followers of the target account;
ti : number of tweets of the i-th follower of the target
account;
ϕi : number of friends of the i-th follower of the target
account;
fi : number of followers of the i-th follower of the
target account.
The number of API calls for each category depends
on the maximum number of accounts (100), tweets (200)
and friends/followers (5000) that can be fetched from
Twitter with a single API request. For example, for
the profile category, a single API call can return 100





API calls in total. The
detailed costs do not account for the initial download of







Table 5 also shows the minimum (Best-case) and max-
imum (Worst-case) number of API calls that could possi-
bly be required, that depend on the length of the time-
lines and the number of relationships of the followers.
The Best-case is when a single API call is sufficient to
get all the data for a single follower. For the Worst-case
we can precisely evaluate the number of API calls for
the timeline category, since the number of tweets that
can be accessed from a user timeline is limited to 3200,
leading to a maximum of 16 calls for each follower. The
number of friends and followers, instead, is not limited
and, therefore, it is impossible to calculate a worst-
case scenario for the relationship category. However, we
can consider the account with the maximum number
of followers on Twitter, which, at the time of writing,
belongs to the pop star Lady Gaga (@ladygaga), with
about 40 millions of followers. We can therefore consider
as the worst-case scenario an account with 40 millions
followers and 40 millions friends, which leads to a
number of API calls equal to 16000 ∗ f.
Observing the values of Table 5, we have a clear idea of
the order of magnitude of each class: features in Class B
are 100 times more costly than features of Class A, while
features of Class C could be several orders of magnitude
more costly than features of Class A.
To protect Twitter from abuse, the number of API
calls allowed per minute is limited. In Table 5, we also
report the maximum number of calls allowed per minute
(Calls/min.), which directly impacts on the time needed
to complete the data acquisition.
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Feature set Class A (profile) Class B (timeline) Class C (relationships)
Camisani-Calzolari [3]
has name, has image, has address, has
biography, followers≥30, belongs to a
list, tweets≥50, URL in profile,
2*followers≥friends
geo-localized, is favorite, uses
punctuation, uses hashtag, uses
iPhone, uses Android, uses
Foursquare, uses Instagram, uses
Twitter.com, userID in tweet, tweets
with URLs, retweet≥1, uses
different clients
State of search [18] bot in biography, following:followers =100:1, duplicate profile pictures
same sentence to many accounts,
tweet from API
Socialbakers [17]
friends:followers ≥ 50:1, default
image after 2 months, no bio, no
location, friends ≥100, 0 tweets
tweets spam phrases, same
tweet≥3, retweets ≥ 90%,
tweet-links≥ 90%
Stringhini [22]
number of friends, number of tweets,
friends
(followersˆ2)
tweet similarity, URL ratio




to median neighbor’s followers
TABLE 6
Feature crawling cost classes
results evaluation metrics
classifier TP TN FP FN precision recall F-M. MCC
Class C classifiers that use all the features
RF Random Forest 1931 1944 6 19 0.997 0.990 0.994 0.987
J48 Decision Tree 1935 1932 18 15 0.991 0.992 0.992 0.983
D Decorate 1931 1934 16 19 0.992 0.990 0.991 0.982
AB AdaBoost 1924 1927 23 26 0.988 0.987 0.987 0.975
BN BayesNet 1860 1883 47 90 0.975 0.954 0.964 0.931
Class A classifiers that use only Class A features
RF Random Forest 1911 1937 13 39 0.993 0.980 0.987 0.967
D Decorate 1912 1924 26 38 0.987 0.981 0.984 0.964
J48 Decision Tree 1909 1909 41 41 0.979 0.979 0.979 0.958
AB AdaBoost 1889 1901 49 61 0.975 0.969 0.972 0.941
BN BayesNet 1877 1889 61 73 0.969 0.963 0.966 0.928
TABLE 7
Performance comparison for 10-fold cross validation.
Some further considerations follow. Firstly, data col-
lected for a category can be used to evaluate all the
features of that category. Secondly, Twitter limits the
number of calls of the same API, but different APIs
can be called in parallel. This means that data for all
the three feature categories can be possibly acquired
contemporary. The total time required to collect all data
depends on the category that requires more time, i.e., the
relationship one. In other words, to get the total time, one
must not consider the sum of the time needed for each
of the three cost classes, but just the most costly.
6.2 The Class A classifier
All the rules and features considered in this study
fall into one of the three aforementioned categories,
as reported in Table 6. Therefore, their crawling cost
impacts on the final cost of the whole feature set and,
ultimately, to the class of the classifier: a classifier that
uses a certain feature set belongs to the class of the more
expensive feature. This means that all the classifiers we
have analyzed in the previous sections are classifiers of
Class B, excepting for the classifier with the feature set
of Yang et al. that belongs to Class C.
In the following, we consider an optimized classifier
working only with features of Class A. The aim is verify-
ing whether the Class A classifier reaches performances
that are comparable to those of the more expensive Class
B and Class C classifiers.
Table 7 reports the results of the classifiers built with
two different feature sets: all the features and the Class
A features. We start observing that the classifier built
with all the features considered in our study performs
better than all the others, including the classifiers using
the feature set of Yang et al. and Stringhini et al. reported
in Table 3. However, the increase of MCC between the
best classifier and our optimized Class A classifier is
very limited, i.e., around 0.03 for RF, D, J48 and AB.
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Class A classifier with BN only decreases its precision,
but increases its recall, obtaining a MCC very close to
the best classifier. Concerning the complexity of the
two decision trees obtained with the J48 algorithm, we
also observe that they are comparable, since the best
classifier is composed by 31 nodes, while our Class A
classifier by 41 nodes, and they have a height of 6 and
8 respectively. Another interesting observation is that
both the classifiers select features that belong to different
feature sets considered above, including some rules like
has tweeted a userID and has URL in profile, proposed by
Camisani-Calzolari [3].
7 CONCLUSIONS
The motivations for this paper steamed from the lack of
rigorous definitions and criteria for the identification of
fake followers on Twitter. Our main research objective
was to assess the performance of the features used to
recognize Twitter spam accounts —suggested in both
the grey and the Academic literature— when applied to
recognize fake accounts. To reach this goal, we firstly
created a gold standard of human and fake Twitter
accounts. Then, we collected and precisely analyzed
various spam detection proposals based on classification
rules and feature sets proposed in both the Academic
and the grey literature, to target spambots and inac-
tive accounts. From this extensive state of the art, we
extracted several sets of rules and features that were
eventually tested on our dataset to understand their
effectiveness in detecting fake follower accounts. A few
selected features performed pretty well and were very
effective in spotting fake accounts, as shown using classi-
fiers relying on optimized Machine Learning algorithms.
We further analyzed the best performing features, and
ranked them according to their crawling cost. This led us
to identify three categories of features incurring increas-
ing crawling cost. Finally, we built an optimized classifier
for fake follower account detection that only leverages
lightweight features; we showed that our proposal is
able to achieve detection rates comparable with the best
of breed classifiers, whereas these latter ones necessitate
overhead-demanding features.
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